Unpacking the UK’s ‘100-Year Partnership’ with Ukraine: A Political Stunt or a Strategic Alliance?

Unpacking the UK’s ‘100-Year Partnership’ with Ukraine: A Political Stunt or a Strategic Alliance?

In a significant diplomatic move, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled a 100-year partnership between the UK and Ukraine during their meeting in Kyiv on January 16. This announcement comes at a crucial time when Ukraine is seeking steadfast allies amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.

The partnership, while ambitious in its title, raises questions about its substance and implications. Treaties often serve as the backbone of international relations, and the announcement of new agreements typically coincides with high-profile visits. Since 1892, the United Kingdom has entered into more than 15,000 treaties, and this recent agreement with Ukraine should be viewed through that lens.

The UK has previously established various partnerships, such as the agreements made with Qatar during Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s state visit in December 2024. These included a substantial $1.3 billion agreement focused on cooperation in fintech and green energy, alongside initiatives to enhance humanitarian funding.

Agreements like these often reflect one nation’s eagerness to showcase diplomatic success. A personal example includes a cultural agreement I facilitated between the UK and Indonesia during President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s visit in the summer of 2002. The Foreign Office viewed it as an inconsequential document, yet it held significant value for the Indonesian side.

Despite the apparent sincerity of Starmer and Zelenskyy regarding the 100-year partnership, its significance remains questionable. Both leaders are striving for positive headlines amid a changing Western approach towards Ukraine.

With the recent inauguration of President Trump, who aims to conclude the Ukraine war within 100 days, the landscape of international support for Ukraine is likely to shift. Even if the new administration maintains some level of military aid, it is improbable that it will reach the staggering $175 billion provided since the conflict’s onset in 2022.

Germany, Ukraine’s second-largest donor, has halved its financial support over the past year, grappling with internal debates over an additional $3 billion aid package ahead of elections. Consequently, this leaves the UK, as Ukraine’s third-largest supporter, in a challenging position to fill the widening gap in political, financial, and military support.

However, the UK’s ability to step up support is limited. The £4 billion ($5 billion) allocated to Ukraine annually since 2022 is relatively modest compared to American contributions and far less than the significant financial aid from Germany.

Currently, the British government has no additional funds to allocate, regardless of Prime Minister Starmer’s intentions. Since the Labour government assumed power in July 2024, it has faced severe economic challenges. With UK government debt surpassing 100% of gross domestic product (GDP) and a sharp rise in borrowing costs, Starmer warned of potential cuts to public services while on his visit to Ukraine.

Recent missteps, such as the poorly managed reduction of winter fuel payments for the elderly, have left the Labour government on the brink of cutting disability benefits. This spells trouble not only for British citizens but also for Zelenskyy in Kyiv.

In contrast to the US, UK policy towards Ukraine enjoys bipartisan support in Parliament. The mainstream media in the UK has shielded both Conservative and Labour governments from scrutiny regarding their financial commitments to Ukraine. However, as President Trump pushes for ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and economic challenges mount in Britain, the specter of cuts to spending on Ukraine may soon emerge.

In this context, the much-publicized 100-year partnership lacks new substance. The UK and Ukraine had already established a comprehensive 568-page political, free trade, and strategic partnership agreement in 2020, which was presented to Parliament shortly before the war erupted in January 2022.

The strategic dialogue that was announced recently was already part of the 2020 treaty. The £3 billion ($3.7 billion) in annual military funding has been in place since the war began, and the £2.2 billion ($2.7 billion) loan was part of the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan of $50 billion for Ukraine, agreed upon in June 2024.

The only newly introduced funding was a relatively small £40 million aimed at fostering the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in Ukraine’s struggling economy, sourced from Britain’s development assistance budget. There were no groundbreaking revelations or significant commitments made during this announcement.

In essence, the UK is not in a position to extend further financial aid to Ukraine. While this situation may evolve over the next century, immediate changes are unlikely. Furthermore, no government would be willing to commit to a binding obligation of £3 billion in yearly military support for a century.

Starmer’s phrasing of support “for as long as it takes” provides him with a potential exit strategy to reduce spending if a ceasefire brokered by Trump is achieved. A ceasefire would likely compel Kyiv to curtail its extensive military expenditures, which currently represent 50% of government spending and a quarter of GDP annually.

The notion of a 100-year agreement is, in legal terms, largely devoid of commitment, as nations can withdraw from treaties at any time. Historical precedents include Russia and the US, which have both exited various nuclear arms control agreements in recent years.

There is no assurance that a future British government would not abandon this agreement if it deemed it a burdensome political liability. Ultimately, the 100-year partnership appears to be more of a political maneuver than a substantive commitment, a desperate attempt by Starmer to demonstrate that the UK can bolster dwindling Western support for Ukraine at a delicate juncture in international relations.

Ian Proud, a former member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023, previously served as a senior officer at the British Embassy in Moscow during a particularly tense period in UK-Russia relations from July 2014 to February 2019.

(Source: Al Jazeera)

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