US Urges Turkey to Sever Energy Links with Russia and Iran for Stronger Alliances

Turkey is poised to significantly enhance its energy independence and security by potentially fulfilling over half of its gas requirements by the end of 2028. This strategic shift involves ramping up domestic production and increasing imports from the United States, which poses a challenge to the longstanding energy dominance of Russian and Iranian suppliers in the European market. According to a recent report by Reuters, this transformation is not only vital for Turkey’s energy landscape but also aligns with broader geopolitical pressures.

In recent discussions, particularly during a meeting on September 25 at the White House, US President Donald Trump urged Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to diminish energy purchases from Russia. The US has been actively encouraging its allies, including NATO member Turkey, to reduce their energy dependency on Moscow and Tehran.

By diversifying its energy supply sources, Turkey aims to bolster its energy security and enhance its ambition of becoming a regional gas hub. Analysts indicate that Ankara plans to re-export liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported from abroad, alongside its domestic gas production, to European markets while utilizing Russian and Iranian gas for domestic consumption.

Key Points on Turkey’s Energy Strategy:

• Turkey has indicated its intention to capitalize on the global abundance of LNG, as noted by Sohbet Karbuz from the Mediterranean Organisation for Energy and Climate.
• Although Russia remains Turkey’s largest gas supplier, its market share has declined drastically from over 60% two decades ago to approximately 37% in the first half of 2025.
• Most European nations ceased imports from Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• Turkey’s long-term pipeline contracts with Russia, which supply 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually through the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines, are nearing expiration.
• Iran’s contract, which supplies 10 bcm, is set to expire in mid-2024, while Azerbaijan’s contracts of 9.5 bcm will run until 2030 and 2033.

Experts suggest that while Turkey may extend certain contracts with these countries, it will likely pursue more flexible terms and smaller volumes to enhance supply diversification. Concurrently, Turkey is actively expanding its alternative energy sources. The state-owned company TPAO is increasing output from domestic gas fields, and both state and private entities are enhancing LNG import terminals to facilitate gas imports from the US and Algeria.

According to Reuters calculations, domestic production and contracted LNG imports are projected to exceed 26 bcm annually by 2028, a significant increase from the current 15 bcm. This development is crucial as it would meet over half of Turkey’s projected gas demand of around 53 bcm, reducing the reliance on pipeline imports to approximately 26 bcm—well below the 41 bcm currently contracted from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan combined.

US LNG Imports Set to Double

To facilitate this transition, Turkey has inked a series of LNG contracts with American suppliers totaling $43 billion, including a significant 20-year agreement with Mercuria established in September. The nation has also developed an annual LNG import capacity of 58 bcm, which is sufficient to meet its entire gas requirements, as reported by Turkey’s energy exchange.

Despite these advancements, Russian gas continues to flow into Turkey at full capacity, and the Kremlin has maintained that its cooperation with Ankara is robust. Experts like Alexey Belogoryev from the Institute for Energy and Finance in Moscow suggest that while Turkey could theoretically halt imports from Russia in two to three years due to reduced needs, it is unlikely to do so. This is primarily because Russian gas remains competitively priced and offers BOTAS, Turkey’s state pipeline company, leverage in negotiations with other suppliers.

In a recent TV interview, Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar emphasized the necessity for Turkey to source gas from all available suppliers, including Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. He also acknowledged that US LNG presents more affordable alternatives.

The energy ministry has refrained from commenting on prospective supply agreements and pricing strategies. Meanwhile, Gazprom, the Russian gas export monopoly, did not respond to inquiries regarding future contracts.

Looking ahead, Turkey has the potential to utilize Russian and Iranian gas domestically while exporting its own production and re-exporting imported LNG, particularly as Europe moves to phase out Russian energy imports by 2028. Karbuz points out that Turkey’s BOTAS has already established agreements to supply small quantities of gas to Hungary and Romania, further solidifying its position as a regional gas trading hub.

Turkey’s energy landscape is not limited to gas; the nation maintains strong ties with Moscow. Notably, Russia’s Rosatom is currently constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, and Moscow remains a key supplier of crude oil and diesel to Turkey.