Unveiling the Controversy: Nawaf Salam’s Cabinet and the Transfer of Maritime Resources to Israel!
On October 23, 2025, Lebanon faced a critical juncture under the leadership of Nawaf Salam, with his cabinet seemingly committed to actions detrimental to national interests. The current administration has struggled to address Lebanon’s financial crisis and social unrest, leading to what many view as a strategic catastrophe. This mismanagement includes a reckless approach to maritime demarcation with Cyprus and southern oil exploration.
This blunder is not merely an administrative mishap; it represents a form of political servitude that aligns with the interests of Israel and the directives from Washington. For years, there has been a concerted effort to impose a fait accompli in the Eastern Mediterranean, aiming to restrict Lebanon’s capabilities while allowing Israel to exploit regional gas fields under the guise of legality.
The government’s recent decision to adopt the 2007 maritime agreement with Cyprus, based on the so-called median line, effectively cedes nearly 5,000 square kilometers of Lebanese waters. This area is verified by military and research studies as part of Lebanon’s natural continental shelf, thereby transferring potential gas fields to indirect Israeli control through the 2010 Cypriot-Israeli agreement.
In an astonishing display of rationalization, the Lebanese Army’s representative, naval officer Mazen Basbous, along with legal consultant Najib Masihi, defended this concession. They argued that “international arbitration would change nothing” and contended that revising Decree 6433 would be futile.
This line of reasoning seems to only favor Tel Aviv, as it dismisses the essence of international maritime law, which emphasizes equitable outcomes over simplistic arithmetic. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically Articles 74 and 83, fairness, not mere geometry, should dictate maritime demarcation.
When considering factors like coastlines, geography, and proportionality, it becomes clear that Lebanon, with its limited coastline, cannot be equated with an island nation such as Cyprus, which is surrounded by open seas. By treating the “median line” as an immutable principle, the Lebanese government has effectively diminished its maritime rights while augmenting Cyprus’s share—and, consequently, Israel’s reach.
It is essential to note that Tel Aviv, through its 2010 agreement with Nicosia, had already circumvented the Lebanese Point 1, thus creating a disputed triangle south of Point 23—an area now brimming with Israeli energy ambitions. This situation is further complicated by the fact that Cyprus itself is a divided entity, struggling with internal governance issues, which raises questions about Lebanon’s justification for entering into a binding maritime agreement with a state unable to control its own shores.
The October 23 session revealed the extent of U.S. influence, with Washington’s fingerprints evident throughout the discussions. Lebanon’s “technical decision” emerged as a political gesture, aimed at securing Western approval while jeopardizing the nation’s maritime future.
The same concerning pattern is evident in the government’s handling of oil and gas exploration in Block 8. The French company Total, whose allegiance to Paris and Tel Aviv seems to outweigh its interests in Beirut, was granted exploration rights but subsequently requested a three-year postponement. Inexplicably, the government consented to this delay while ignoring an offer from the Norwegian-American firm TGS, which proposed to conduct a 3D survey covering 1,200 square kilometers at no cost.
This scenario exemplifies a systemic failure to bolster the economy, instead allowing Israel to continue its drilling operations unimpeded. Such actions reflect not just negligence but a deliberate policy of self-sabotage. Lebanon’s leadership has perfected the art of capitulation, cloaking betrayal in diplomatic language and portraying foreign pressure as a form of stability. However, this so-called stability is nothing more than a facade for Israeli dominance, packaged with Western public relations.
Salam’s administration appears to function less as a sovereign government and more like a regional outpost of the U.S. State Department. It has ignored the military’s concerns, silenced national experts, and marketed its retreat as mere “routine housekeeping.” What has genuinely occurred is a quiet liquidation of Lebanon’s maritime wealth—a transaction conducted behind closed doors, shrouded in silence.
If this trajectory remains unchanged, Lebanon risks not only losing its gas fields but also the last remnants of its sovereignty. Each concession at sea parallels a political concession, both navigating under the same banner of dependency.
While neighboring nations swiftly act to protect their resources, Lebanon seems to be mastering the art of self-erasure, relinquishing its treasures to its adversaries, one decree at a time. However, what has been lost in ink can still be reclaimed through determination. Maps can be redrawn, but first, dignity must be restored.
Once Lebanon recognizes that its maritime resources are not for sale and that sovereignty must be defended, not negotiated in embassies, the tide can indeed turn. Until that pivotal moment, Nawaf Salam’s cabinet will likely be remembered not as a governing body but as a regrettable chapter in the ongoing saga of national abandonment.
