From Control to Cash: The Profitable Shift of Internet Filtering in Iran
Despite the Iranian regime’s promises of reform, internet censorship remains a significant issue, transforming VPN sales into a multi-billion-toman industry for regime insiders. This situation highlights the ongoing struggle for digital freedom in Iran, as millions of citizens seek ways to bypass oppressive restrictions.
A Year After Empty Promises
One year following the Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian’s commitment to easing internet filtering on social networks, the situation has not improved. Major platforms such as:
- YouTube
- X (Twitter)
- Telegram
- TikTok
- Netflix
- Viber
- Clubhouse
- Snapchat
- Signal
- Google Play
- Discord
- Waze
remain blocked throughout the country. Yet, millions of Iranians are circumventing these barriers using VPNs, with international statistics indicating that between 50 and 60 million people access Instagram and Telegram daily through these services. The regime’s inability to fulfill its promises has exposed the deceit behind its rhetoric and clarified the underlying motives for continued censorship.
Censorship as a Tool of Repression
The primary aim of these internet restrictions is to suppress dissent and stifle protests. During times of upheaval, the regime deliberately reduces internet speeds, increases disruptions, or implements nationwide shutdowns. By controlling access to global platforms, the regime aims to:
- Disconnect citizens from real news
- Silence citizen journalists
- Prevent the circulation of critical voices
However, despite these oppressive measures, the Iranian populace continues to resist censorship through VPN usage.
The Business of Filtering: Profits for Insiders
Filtering has also morphed into a highly profitable business. Experts and officials have acknowledged that influential regime insiders benefit greatly from VPN sales. Ministers, parliament members, and other officials have confirmed that substantial revenues generated from this parallel market flow directly into institutions associated with the state and military-security apparatus.
Reports from the regime’s own Parliament Research Center and the Tehran E-Commerce Association reveal that over 80 percent of Iranian internet users depend on VPNs, with nearly one-third choosing paid services. The average monthly cost of VPNs ranges from 250,000 to 500,000 tomans, leading to an annual turnover worth several trillion tomans. Abolhassan Firouzabadi, former secretary of the Supreme Cyberspace Council, noted last year that even sizable companies are involved in the VPN trade, describing the market as having a “significant volume.” Unlike China, which has invested in domestic platforms, Iran’s filtering system has instead fostered a gray market that enriches insiders.
Who Benefits and Who Suffers
Digital businesses have been disproportionately affected by these restrictions. The Tehran E-Commerce Association has warned that reliance on insecure VPNs exposes users to:
- Phishing
- Data theft
- Potential exploitation for cyberattacks
The rise of free, infected VPNs has also contributed to an increase in cyberattacks originating from Iran. Additionally, the political and corrupt aspects of this trade are becoming increasingly evident. Members of parliament, including Javad Nikbin, have openly stated that “the same people who implement filtering are also the main sellers of VPNs.” Reports indicate that even children of regime elites—known as Aghazadehs—are heavily involved in this trade. One notable case involved the son of Ensiyeh Khazali, a former deputy for women’s affairs under Ebrahim Raisi.
Thus, filtering serves a dual purpose: it enforces repression while simultaneously generating billions in revenue for regime cronies.
Filtering as a Profitable Sanction
Just as international sanctions have been exploited by regime officials and military institutions for illicit profits, filtering has become yet another source of black-market profiteering. Any serious attempt to lift these restrictions would jeopardize this lucrative revenue stream, making it improbable that the regime will voluntarily abandon the practice.
The financial toll on the Iranian people is severe. Citizens are estimated to spend over 100 trillion tomans annually on VPNs—funds that could otherwise support legitimate digital businesses and drive innovation. Nima Ghazi, head of the Tehran E-Commerce Association, has warned that persistent filtering will not only hinder Iran’s digital economy from competing on a global scale but will also push technology professionals abroad, create widespread frustration within the workforce, and ultimately lead to the collapse of the country’s innovation ecosystem.
In conclusion, Iran’s internet filtering has evolved into more than just a repressive measure; it has become a significant source of profit for regime insiders and their families. While officials enrich themselves, ordinary citizens bear the financial burden, businesses struggle, and Iran’s digital future hangs in the balance. The ongoing filtering exemplifies the deep intertwining of corruption and repression within the regime, rendering promises of reform nothing more than empty rhetoric.
