Germany’s Bold Nuclear Renaissance: Rethinking Energy Strategies for a Sustainable Future

The upcoming changes in Germany’s defense strategy come in response to shifting global security dynamics, particularly the uncertainties surrounding U.S. President Donald Trump’s potential withdrawal of security guarantees. The new coalition government, formed by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD), is preparing to make significant adjustments in its defense posture, with a focus on increasing military expenditure. This article explores the implications of these changes and the evolving public sentiment regarding nuclear deterrence in Germany.

The coalition has proposed reforms to the debt brake, which would enable a marked increase in military spending. CDU leader Friedrich Merz, expected to be Germany’s next chancellor, emphasized that, “in view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent,” the government must adopt a new motto: “whatever it takes.”

One critical aspect of this defense strategy is whether the new government will pursue a Plan B in the event of the U.S. nuclear security umbrella being withdrawn from Germany and Europe. Key points include:

• Germany’s need for a comprehensive nuclear policy rethink.
• Efforts to establish nuclear sharing at the European level with France and the UK to deter threats from Russia and other adversaries.
• Investments in civilian nuclear research to maintain nuclear latency as a strategic hedge.

Fortunately, Merz has shown willingness to advocate for these measures. Currently, Germany hosts approximately 20 U.S. B-61 nuclear bombs at the Büchel airbase. Historically, the majority of Germans supported the removal of these nuclear weapons, reflecting a broader desire to eliminate all forms of nuclear capabilities. In a survey from mid-2021, only 14% of Germans favored the presence of nuclear weapons on their soil.

The landscape shifted dramatically following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. By mid-2022, 52% of Germans surveyed by Panorama magazine expressed support for keeping or even increasing U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany. The invasion and the accompanying threats from Russia underscored the necessity of a nuclear umbrella for many German citizens.

In response to these threats, Chancellor Olaf Scholz initiated a €10 billion ($13.85 billion) deal with the United States to procure F-35 fighter jets, aimed at modernizing the aging Tornado fleet that carries the nuclear bombs stationed in Germany. This deal was intended to solidify U.S. commitments to Germany’s defense framework.

Scholz has pursued a close relationship with Washington, despite the political turbulence following Trump’s return to the White House. At the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, he stated, “We will not agree to any solution that leads to a decoupling of European and American security.” However, this assertion raises questions about the extent of Germany’s influence, as the decision ultimately rests with the United States.

In contrast, Friedrich Merz’s tone indicates a desire for greater independence from the U.S. Before the official election results were released on February 23, he expressed, “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” He also questioned whether NATO would exist in its current form by the time of the upcoming summit in June, hinting at the need for a more rapid establishment of independent European defense capabilities.

Merz is advocating for a Plan B that includes discussions with France and the UK about potential nuclear-sharing arrangements. This marks a significant shift in the German defense dialogue, as previous leaders like Angela Merkel and Scholz largely overlooked French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposals for strategic dialogue regarding nuclear deterrence in Europe. During a televised address on March 5, Macron positively responded to Merz’s “historic call,” indicating a willingness to open discussions on the strategic protection of European allies through nuclear deterrence.

This alignment between Merz and Macron sets a promising foundation for advancing discussions around European nuclear sharing. Nonetheless, critics have raised concerns about the potential risks and challenges in implementing these proposals. Some experts, like German arms control researcher Ulrich Kühn, have dismissed these policy suggestions as overly cautious, but the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy necessitates serious contemplation of a potential U.S. exit from NATO.

To establish a sustainable framework for European nuclear sharing, several key considerations must be addressed:

• Creating a realistic political arrangement for extended deterrence.
• Reforming NATO’s nuclear planning group at the European level, potentially involving France and the UK as primary powers.
• Ensuring that any nuclear-sharing initiatives are financially supported by participating countries.

As discussions progress, both France and the UK would retain final decision-making authority over their nuclear arsenals, similar to the current arrangement with the U.S. Historical precedents suggest that even smaller nuclear arsenals can serve as credible deterrents, provided they are perceived as capable of inflicting unacceptable damage in a conflict.

Critics have argued that focusing on European nuclear deterrence detracts from necessary investments in conventional military capabilities. However, experts like Bruno Tertrais argue that it is essential to pursue both avenues simultaneously. While the UK relies on the U.S. for certain aspects of its nuclear arsenal, French capabilities are fully autonomous, which enhances their credibility in the face of a potential U.S. withdrawal from European security commitments.

Concerns about global nuclear proliferation arising from a shift toward European nuclear sharing are often overstated. Countries like South Korea and Turkey will base their nuclear ambitions on their own assessments of regional security threats, independent of European decisions.

As Germany contemplates its future security arrangements, questions arise regarding the political stability of its European partners, especially in light of rising far-right sentiments in the UK and France. Despite these uncertainties, the alternative to seeking a European nuclear umbrella would be for Germany to pursue its own nuclear capabilities, a prospect fraught with political, financial, and logistical challenges.

To maintain strategic options, Germany must invest in civilian nuclear research, which is increasingly vital in an era of heightened energy demands and the need to transition away from fossil fuels. As a leading economy, Germany has a responsibility to spearhead advancements in civilian nuclear technology.

In the early days of Trump’s administration, Merkel stated, “we Europeans must truly take our destiny into our own hands,” yet tangible actions were limited. Today, the consequences of taking this statement seriously are unfolding rapidly.

Merz’s call to prepare for the worst while hoping for the best might evoke discomfort among some Germans, but it is essential to include a robust nuclear deterrence strategy in this preparation. The evolving landscape demands a proactive approach, ensuring Germany’s security in an increasingly complex global environment.

— Thorsten Benner, Co-founder and Director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

(Source: Foreign Policy)